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The purpose of this report is to examine construction contract
negotiation as it applies to the Navy Civil Engineer Corps (CEC)
officer. The CEC is responsible for $2-3 billion each year in military
construction performed by civilian contractors under Navy contracts
(NAVFACENGCOM, 1 986). Currently, 35% of the CEC officers are in
billets which require negotiating with civilian construction
contractors (Chief of Civil Engineers, 1986). The number of
construction contracts performed by civilian contractors is growing,
as is the Navy's need for negotiation expertise in the construction
area.
The emphasis of this paper is on the methods and procedures of
construction contract negotiations as they apply to the CEC officer.
Topics examined include the circumstances which allow procurement
through negotiation vice formal advertising, the phases of
negotiation, and recommended approaches to these phases.
The three phases of the negotiation process are preparation,
performance, and documentation. Preparation is the most important
phase of negotiating because of its vast impact on all actions which
follow. Planning strategy and forming a negotiation team are primary

functions of preparation. Performance of the negotiation can also be
viewed in phases. Opening the meeting, the gathering of further
information during the meeting to confirm assumptions, issues, and
objectives, and the actual negotiation towards agreement are all
stages of negotiation performance. Documentation justifies that the
negotiation results are fair and reasonable and serves as a historical
record.
There are many ways to approach the three phases of
negotiation. Methods of approach which promote win-win negotiating
are recommended. This involves finding a solution that provides
mutual satisfaction to all parties while maintaining the highest
standards of conduct. Tactics are an inherent part of all negotiations,
including win-win negotiations. Even if one does not use tactics, it is
necessary to understand the dynamics and reasoning behind them for
protection. Because, whether the reader uses tactics or not, the
contractor will be using them to gain maximum advantage.
For the CEC officer to be an effective negotiator, he must
thoroughly understand the methods and procedures of negotiation. He
must have knowledge of the government regulations which apply, and

an understanding of the negotiation environment. Proficiency in
communication, both verbal and non-verbal, as well as in strategy and
tactics is also needed to successfully negotiate with the professional
contractor.
This paper does not establish negotiating policy for the Navy or
any portion of the government. Furthermore, it does not necessarily
reflect the views of the United States Government or the Navy. If
there is any conflict between this paper and official publications, the





Title 10 of the United States Code, sections 2301-2314 (1986),
known as The Armed Services Procurement Act (ASPA) requires the
use of formal advertising in all cases in which the use of such a
method is feasible and practical. The steps of formal advertising are
described in the Code of Federal Acquisition Regulations (Code of
Federal Acquisition Regulations [FAR], 1986) as the preparation of an
Invitation for Bids (IFB), its publication and distribution, and the
public opening, recording, and tabulating of bids received. This is
done at a preestablished time stated in the Invitation For Bids.
Award of contract is made to the lowest responsive and responsible
bidder (FAR, 1986; U. S. Naval School, 1986). This is also referred to
as the use of full and open competition, or "the process by which all
responsible offerors are allowed to compete" (FAR, 1986, p. 53).
The advantages to formal advertising are many. First,
procurement through formal advertising, under normal circumstances,
assures the government the lowest possible price consistent with
the procurement of satisfactory work. Second, by bringing all aspects

of the selection process into the open and by relying on a single
criterion for award - the lowest responsive and responsible bid -
suspicion of favoritism is diminished and public confidence in the
government procurement policies is bolstered. Finally, formal
advertising gives all interested persons an equal opportunity to
compete for and obtain government contracts backed by public funds
(Jayson & Edwards, 1986; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
Formal advertised bidding is not always feasible. Without the
following prerequisites, the advantages of formal advertising may not
be obtained: (a) Detailed plans and specifications which can be bid
upon competitively are necessary to ensure the prospective
contractor is provided optimal opportunity to prepare a proposal
based on the best information available; (b) non-classified plans and
specifications; (c) a sufficient number of bidders, at least three are
required, who are able and willing to compete for the business; and
(d) sufficient time. The amount of time required to prepare plans and
specifications and to evaluate bids should not be underestimated (U.S.
Naval School, 1986).

The failure to meet each of these conditions satisfactorily may
make awarding a contract on the basis of low bid not only undesirable
but impossible. For example, if it were impossible to distribute
detailed plans and specifications for a given job, prospective bidders
would have insufficient basis for preparing their bids. Potential
contractors could refuse to submit any bid. The bidders could also
include substantial contingency allowances in the estimate to protect
themselves against the high margin of error imposed by lack of
adequate information. The potential expense to the government in
this case is considerable (U. S. Naval School, 1986).
Negotiation
Negotiation is an alternative to formal advertised bidding.
Inability to satisfy one or more of the four prerequisites listed above
may indicate that procurement through negotiation is in order. The
definition of negotiation and the specific conditions under which
contracts may be negotiated must first be examined closely.
The FAR (1986) defines negotiation as "contracting through the
use of either competitive or other-than-competitive proposals and
discussions. Any contract awarded without using sealed bidding

procedures is a negotiated contract" (FAR, 1986, p. 181). The Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFACENGCOM) Contracting Manual
P-68 (1985) defines a negotiated contract as one "without public
advertising and open competitive bidding" (p. 5.1). The Civil Engineer
Corps Officers School (CECOS) manual An Introduction To NAVFAC
Contracting (1 974) defines a negotiated contract as one "where
formal advertising is not feasible or practical, and a contract is
awarded without public advertising and competitive bidding" (p. 21).
Public advertising is often used to increase qualified sources for
negotiated contracts, particularly in the case of highly technical
contracts.
Authority to Negotiate
The ASPA (1986) and the policies of FAR (1986) require formal
advertising. Only when formal advertising is not feasible or practical
and one of the statutory exceptions is met, is there valid reason not
to use formal advertising. Every negotiated procurement must be
justified under one of the exceptions. The circumstances permitting
other than full and open competition that have general application to
NAVFACENGCOM are as follows: (a) only one responsible source is
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8available; (b) national emergency; (c) public exigency, as determined
by NAVFACENGCOM, will not allow the delay incident to formal
advertising; (d) the contract amount is less than $2,500; (e) the
contract is for personal or professional services; (f) contract is for
any service by a university, college, or other educational institution;
(g) contract is for services of property to be procured and used
outside the United States and its possessions; (h) impractical to
obtain competition (often cited for utilities, highly specialized
equipment, and construction contract modifications); or (i) otherwise
authorized by law. Chapter 1 , subpart 6.302 of the FAR (1 986) allows
procurement by negotiation under any of the above exceptions.
Reference to the specific authority under which it was negotiated
must be contained in each contract (FAR, 1986).
Another situation which may require contract negotiation is the
cancellation of bids after opening but prior to contract award. Bids
may be cancelled for many reasons, but only two reasons qualify for
completion of the contract through negotiation. The first reason is
based on bid reasonableness. That is, all bids received are at
unreasonable prices, or only one bid is received and the contracting

officer has no way to determine if the bid is reasonable. Also, if the
bids were not developed independently, or they were submitted in bad
faith, the contract may be completed through negotiation. Permission
to reject all bids and negotiate must be received from
NAVFACENGCOM. If permission is not granted, the contracting officer
must proceed with a new acquisition. In order to preserve the
integrity of the bid system, there must be a compelling reason to
reject all bids (FAR, 1986).
In practice, permission to negotiate is difficult to obtain from
NAVFACENGCOM if there is any possibility that the procurement can
be handled through formal advertising. Nonetheless, there are many
opportunities for CEC officers to be directly involved in the
negotiation process. The prudent officer will wisely familiarize
himself with the regulations, procedures, and strategies, and tactics
for this method of awarding and modifying contracts without using
sealed bid procedures.
Competition in Negotiated Contracts
The absence of open competitive bidding and sealed bids does
not mean that competition is absent. Negotiated contracts most often
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involve competition, with the rare exceptions of sole source
negotiations and contracts for amounts less than $2,500. For all
negotiated procurements exceeding $2,500, 10 USC 2304 (1986)
requires that proposals must be solicited from the maximum number
of qualified sources (U. S. Naval School, 1986). The result is termed
competitive negotiation . Procedures for obtaining the maximum
number of sources can be found in U. S. Naval School, 1986, p. 3-2,4
and NAVFACENGCOM, 1985, p. 5.2.1,3.
The procedure for awarding competitively negotiated contracts
is a function of the type of contract. The type of contract is
determined by the authority the contract is negotiated under. The FAR
(1986) provides the authority to negotiate based on the exception
cited. Competitive negotiation usually begins with the submittal of a
formal proposal in response to a government Request For Proposal
(RFP). Each proposal is evaluated from both a quality and cost
standpoint. Those proposals within a competitive range are
negotiated. Award is based on the most favorable negotiation results.
Negotiations may be conducted with any number of contractors, which
introduces an element of competition into the negotiations.
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Also in contrast to formal advertising, proposals are never
opened publicly, and the identity of unsuccessful proposers or the
contents of their proposals are not revealed. As is true with all types
of negotiated procurements, approval for competitive negotiation is
not normally granted if there is reason to believe that usual
procedures, formal advertising, would produce timely results (FAR,
1986; NAVFACENGCOM, 1985; Naval School of CEC Officers, 1974; U. S.
Naval School, 1986).
Competitive negotiation is advantageous when: (a) Highly
specialized skill or experience is required; (b) it is essential that the
work start as soon as possible, and it must be in strict compliance
with the plans and specifications; (c) the work will be overseas; or
(d) the project will be turnkey (U. S. Naval School, 1986).
According to Naval School of CEC Officers, 1974, the most
common uses of competitive negotiation by NAVFACENGCOM include:
(1) construction, maintenance, repairs, alterations, and inspectic
when the exact amount of work to be done is unknown; (2) th
purchase of highly specialized equipment; and (3) the securing (
planning, preparation of the design and specifications, an
construction of the facility by a single party, bound by one contrac
The latter is known as a "turnkey" procurement which is used b
NAVFACENGCOM for housing projects", (p. 26)
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Competitive negotiation is not applicable for procurements with
one or more of the following characteristics; (a) the amount is
expected to be less than $2,500, (b) there is not adequate time to
permit the written or oral discussions required for negotiations, (c)
prices are fixed by law or regulation, or (d) the RFP allows award
without discussion of the proposals and adequate competition or cost
experience exists. Negotiation procedures would be utilized, but
without competition.
Even when competitive negotiation procedures are used, it is the
policy of NAVFACENGCOM to make an award to the low conforming
bidder when feasible. Feasibility is determined by contractor
conformance to contract specifications, and the lowest initial
proposal. Negotiation may be warranted when all prices are
unreasonably high or when all proposals do not conform to the terms
of the RFP (FAR, 1986; NAVFACENGCOM, 1985; Naval School of CEC
Officers, 1974; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
When competitive negotiation procedures are used, strict care
must be exercised to ensure no proposer is aware of prices submitted
by others, and that no proposer is advised of the government's price
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that must be met for award. If this information is not protected, an
auction situation exists. Procurement for the government may be
obtained through formal advertising or negotiation, but never by
auction (NAVFACENGCOM, 1985; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
Types of Contract Negotiations
The decision for award of government contracts is essentially
based on two criteria: ability to perform, and price. The nature of
supplies or services to be procured and the procurement method used
determines the degree of emphasis placed on performance or price for
contract award. For example, the award of highly technical contracts
is based primarily on the contractors ability to perform the work. In
contrast, overseas contracts, which involve closed competition
bidding, are awarded primarily on the basis of lowest bid, with
performance a lesser consideration. Many negotiated procurements
can be classified as price competitive or non-price-competitive .
Contract negotiations also occur after contract award. These
negotiations modify the existing contract. Bilateral change orders





The procedures for price competitive negotiations are very
similar to those of formal advertising. The major difference is that
proposals are solicited only from selected firms. The exception to
this would be a firm who requested to be included although not
selected for inclusion. Firms are selected who, in the Contracting
Officer's opinion, have the resources and capability to perform the
work. Most negotiated procurements require only those resources and
skills which are common to the average contractor.
Price-competitive contracts are awarded primarily on the basis of
lowest bid, with performance a lesser consideration (26; 29).
A contract negotiated due to unusual and compelling urgency is
an example of a price competitive negotiated contract. An example
would be construction needed after a hurricane, flood, explosion, or
other disaster. Competition would consist of getting three or more
firms to look at the work and submit prices, with award being made
on the basis of the lowest offer. Another example is a major
construction contract negotiated solely because the work is to be
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done in a foreign country. In this case the award procedures may be
almost identical to those used in formal advertising (33; 29).
Non-Price-Competitive Negotiation
When it is necessary to consider factors other than price in
making award, it is called non-price-competitive negotiation. In
contrast to price competitive negotiations, non-price-competitive
negotiations include contractor interviews as part of the award
procedure. These interviews are used to supplement the contractor's
proposal in the selection of the most qualified contractor. The
personal interview gives the Contract Award and Review Board the
opportunity to more fully understand the contractor's proposal by
discussing in detail the job requirements and conditions, and his
assumptions. In addition, it gives the board the opportunity to
evaluate the general technical and managerial abilities of key
contractor personnel as well as their understanding of the contract
work. Technical competition and cost-reimbursement negotiations
are the most common types of non-price-competitive negotiation in




Technical competition is used when professional competency is
of greater importance than contract price. Examples of this type of
negotiated contract are engineering services (E/S) and architectural
services such as those for testing, specialized engineering studies,
surveys, technical investigations, and design. RFPs are issued to
contractors selected by the Contracting Officer for their ability to
perform the work as well as to those contractors who may request a
proposal. After receipt of proposals, contractors are selected by a
Contract Award and Review Board for negotiation based upon
technical qualifications, experience, organization, key personnel,
workload, support facilities, and other relevant factors. The Board
selects a first and second alternative in case it proves impossible to
reach satisfactory price agreement with the first. If the Contracting
Officer and the selected contractor cannot negotiate a fair and
reasonable price, the first alternate will be contacted and
negotiations will be attempted. Negotiations are normally
accomplished with the original firm selected (NAVFACENGCOM, 1985;




Cost-reimbursement contracts, or cost contracts, are
negotiated and awarded when the nature of the work or other
circumstances make a firm price arrangement impractical. Cost
contracts are used for major rehabilitation of inactivated bases, for
work of an exploratory or experimental nature, for work to be
performed in a war zone, or for other situations where the contractor
cannot reasonably control or predict conditions having a major and
direct effect on the performance of the work (NAVFACENGCOM, 1985).
As with technical competition, RFPs are issued to
contractors selected by the Contracting Officer for their ability to
perform the work as well as to those contractors who may request a
proposal. "The proposals are normally analyzed and evaluated (by the
Contractor Award and Review Board) using the following factors
weighted as shown; (1) contractor's qualifications (50%), (2) job
analysis and plan of operation (20%), (3) estimate of costs (20%), (4)
reimbursement fee (10%)" (Naval School of CEC Officers, 1974, p. 27).
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Other Types of Contract Negotiation
The following contract types can not be categorized as price or
non-price-competitive contracts. Contractor selection and contract
award procedures of the following negotiated contracts differ from
those of these two competitive negotiation categories.
Single Source
Single source, also known as one source or sole source
negotiations, are negotiations conducted with only one firm.
Negotiations are justified if there is only one source which can
provide the required supplies or services or where urgency precludes
the consideration of other sources. After technical competition has
been used to arrive at a single firm, such as an architectural firm, the
price negotiations are called single source. However, in this instance
the negotiations are not single source per se because the Contracting
Officer has the option to negotiate with alternative firms if a fair
and reasonable price cannot be agreed upon. True single source
procurements prevent competition of any type and are therefore




Turnkey negotiation combines both technical and price
considerations. Turnkey contracting is a form of contracting where
the contractor is responsible to not only construct the facility but
also to design and prepare plans and specifications for the project.
The navy only uses this method of procurement for military housing
as a result of restrictions by Congress (U. S. Naval School, 1986). The
basis for award makes competitive bidding without negotiation
impractical. Award is based on comparison of several different
models, site plans, and many kinds of materials and equipment. Sole
reliance on price would result in the purchase of the cheapest
package, no matter how unsatisfactory or costly in the long run.
Award is made to the firm submitting the best proposal in terms of
quality and cost and not necessarily to the firm submitting the
lowest cost proposal. As in all competitive negotiations, there is no
public proposal opening and identities of offerors are not revealed
(NAVFACENGCOM, 1985; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
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Small Busi ness (8(a))
Contracts through the Small Business Administration (SBA) are
termed 8(a) contracts (FAR, 1986). Small business legislation
permits the SBA to select disadvantaged contractors for government
work (FAR, 1986). The SBA seeks out government agencies who
contract, and tries to match the disadvantaged contractors to the
requirements of the agency. The government agency then negotiates
the contract with the SBA. When mutually agreeable, and as is
common practice, the SBA may authorize the government to negotiate
directly with the contractor (FAR, 1986; NAVFACENGCOM, 1985).
Small Purchase
Small Purchase contracts are a simplified method of
contracting that may be used when certain conditions are met. They
are contracts for supplies, services, and construction for $25,000 or
less. Contracts for supplies, services, and maintenance for amounts
less than $2,500 may be negotiated (NAVFACENGCOM, 1985). For
construction, alteration, or repair, the contract amount must be less
than $2,000 (NAVFACENGCOM, 1985). Negotiation competition is




Negotiations After Contract Award
Contract negotiations are not confined to the negotiation of the
original contract. Contract modifications are required during the
course of a contract for many reasons, particularly on major projects.
Examples of often needed changes are those in technical
characteristics, performance characteristics, and delivery
requirements. Much less common are modifications resulting in
contract termination. The terms and conditions of the contract and
government regulations govern most of the circumstances of these
types of negotiation (NFCTC, 1986; Western Division NAVFACENGCOM,
1983).
Bilateral Change Order
If after a contract is awarded any change is required to the
contract, it will be accomplished by a contract modification.
In-scope bilateral modifications are often termed change orders.
Change orders are usually single source negotiations with the
incumbent contractor acting as the sole source. However, other
sources may exist and performance of the work by these sources may
be feasible. The possibility of using "in house" forces or
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competitively bidding the work should be kept in mind whenever
negotiating changes to existing contracts (NFCTC, 1986; Western
Division NAVFACENGCOM, 1983)
Change orders are very common in construction contracts. Site
conditions different from those on the plans, work delays,
ambiguities in the plans and specifications, and additional work
within the contract scope are common reasons for change order
negotiations. The bilateral change order is the most common type of
negotiation performed by the CEC officer. There is a variety of
reasons and situations which necessitate changes to the original
contract. The sources for the initiation of these modifications are of
three types; user, Engineering Field Division (EFD)/Officer in Charge
of Construction (OICC), and field (NFCTC, 1986; Western Division
NAVFACENGCOM, 1983).
After the design is completed and the contract is awarded, the
user of the facility may decide it needs or wants something different
than that specified in the contract. This occurs even though the user
approves final design before award. The user's mission may have
changed, or the requirement for minor modifications may be
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discovered after contract award. Delivery may be needed sooner than
the date specified in the contract, or suspension of work may be
necessary. Changes to the physical characteristics and technological
capabilities of the facility are the most common types of user
requested changes (NFCTC, 1986; U. S. Naval School, 1986; Western
Division NAVFACENGCOM, 1983).
The EFD or OICC normally initiates modifications as a result of
changes in design criteria or the discovery of design errors during
review of the shop drawings or field inspections. Difficulties
encountered at the field level by the Resident Officer in Charge of
Construction (ROICC) or contractor personnel may also be resolved by
the EFD or OICC (NFCTC, 1986; U. S. Naval School, 1986; Western
Division NAVFACENGCOM, 1983).
Most field initiated changes result from the following
situations; (a) site conditions differ from those shown on the plans,
(b) design errors or deficiencies, (c) the need for coordination of the
contractor's work with other contractors or with the government, (d)
ambiguities in the plans or specifications, or (e) government caused
delay. Field initiated changes are the most common and are often
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numerous in construction contracts (NFCTC, 1986; U. S. Naval School,
1986; Western Division NAVFACENGCOM, 1983).
Termination settlement
Termination settlements are another form of contract
modification. Contracts are terminated only when there are no other
alternatives. Total or partial contract terminations are enacted
either for the convenience of the government or as a result of
contractor default. The reasons for termination for the convenience
of the government are limited only by the government's needs.
Default terminations are the result of the contractor refusing or
failing to complete the work within the time specified in the
contract. In both cases a deductive change for work not completed
must be negotiated as well as possible damages to the contractor or
the government. The atmosphere of the negotiations is similar to
that of sole source negotiations. No price competition is involved.
The contractor has no alternative but to terminate. And the
government has no alternative but to negotiate, unless it decides a
unilateral settlement is required. Termination settlements are
involved, complicated, and difficult. There are few winners and many






Preparation is the most important phase of negotiating (NFCTC,
1985). Negotiation without preparation invites failure. No amount of
experience or skill on the part of the negotiator can compensate for
its absence (Sullivan, 1984). At least as much time should be spent
preparing as negotiating.
The contractor inherently knows more about his proposal than
the government negotiators, giving him a distinct initial advantage.
The contractor knows the assumptions underlying cost estimates, the
areas where contingencies have been added, limits and deadlines, and
most important, the actual amount he is willing to settle for. The
government negotiators must gather as much information as possible
in order to minimize the contractor's advantage. A cardinal rule of
negotiation is to be prepared. The more information the government
negotiators have about the contractor's priorities, financial situation,
deadlines, costs, real needs, and organizational pressures, the better




To be an effective negotiator requires knowledge and proficiency.
Thorough preparation is the key to acquiring these assets.
An effective negotiator must have a broad knowledge base. He
must be thoroughly familiar with regulations that apply to contract
negotiations; he must understand the negotiation environment, eg.
construction; and he must be knowledgeable in business, accounting,
and pricing (NFCTC, 1985).
Proficiency in many areas must be obtained in order to be an
effective negotiator. He must be skillful in planning strategy and
tactics. Proficiency in the art of communication, argument and
persuasion are also required. He must have the ability to identify the
issues involved, develop price positions, and determine his options.
Thorough preparation and tenacity will reward the negotiator many
times in increased knowledge and proficiency (Brooks & Odiorne,
1984; Harris, 1983; Johnston, 1985; NFCTC, 1985).
Negotiation Strategy
Planning strategy is a large part of preparation for negotiation.
Webster's New World Dictionary (1976) defines strategy as "the
science of planning and directing" negotiations, "specifically ,as
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distinguished from tactics, the maneuvering of forces into the most
advantageous position prior to actual engagement" with your opponent
(p. 1407). In other words, strategy is long-range planning concerned
with obtaining long-range goals. Tactical planning is concerned with
reaching short-range goals. Tactical maneuvers and techniques are
the methods and procedures of accomplishing these short-range goals.
Strategy puts one into the position to use tactics, in order to reach
long range goals (Karrass, 1970).
Before entering into formal negotiations with the contractor,
negotiation strategy must be well planned. The acquisition
requirements must be thoroughly understood as well as the
contractor's proposal. Objectives and how they are to be obtained
must be determined. Identification of negotiation issues is also
imperative. Planning for the possibility of not reaching agreement
and investigating alternatives to agreement are also important
elements of strategy (Dawson, 1985; NFCTC, 1985).
Understanding the Acquisition Requirement
Without a clear understanding of what is being purchased, one
cannot dispute what the contractor considers a fair and reasonable
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price. The government estimate provides a basis for negotiations, but
a comprehensive understanding is required to evaluate the
contractor's position. For example, a contractor's price proposal may
contain a price for engineering and fabricating an item that is not
commercially made, but he "must" have it to perform the work. The
government negotiating team must understand the work process to
evaluate the need for the item and alternative methods. Whether the
item or a similar item has been previously fabricated and whether it
is available commercially must also be considered. A simpler, less
costly solution may be found, providing economic benefits to the
government and the contractor. The better the negotiating team
understands the supplies or services it must purchase, the better job
they can do throughout the contracting process. This is especially
true at the negotiating table (NFCTC, 1985).
Other considerations for a better understanding of the
acquisition include critical problem areas and the probable levels of
engineering effort to overcome such problems, what government
furnished property may be provided, and whether the acquisition falls
under the Truth-in-Negotiations Act. Once the team is thoroughly
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familiar with this background information, it is ready to analyze the
contractor's proposal (NFCTC, 1985).
Contractor's Proposal
Price negotiations are meaningless unless both sides have the
same understanding of the acquisition. The government can not
assume that the contractor interprets the terms and conditions of the
contract or modification in the same manner as they do. A common
understanding can be established prior to negotiations. This can be
done through informal meetings or whatever way is most practical. If
a common understanding is not established before negotiations, the
areas of disagreement will become negotiation issues. The
negotiations will then revolve around issues that would have been
simple clarifications if handled earlier. The contractor's proposal
can be analyzed once it is determined that there is commonality of
understanding between the government and the contractor (NFCTC,
1985).
Analysis of the contractor's proposal provides the government
with the information it needs to establish negotiation positions. The
data and information in the proposal give the negotiator a basis to
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defend or promote positions. Analyzing the contractor's method of
price breakdown must be studied as well as the prices. The proposal
provides clues to the contractor's reasoning process when
establishing prices. Combined with other information and data,
including the government estimate, analyzing the contractor's
proposal gives the government the necessary foundation for
establishing price objectives (NFCTC, 1985; Naval School of CEC
Officers, 1974).
Objectives
The price objective is the negotiation position that is
considered a fair and reasonable target for the acquisition. Definite
price objectives enable a fair settlement, the reasons for which can
be well justified and documented. Objectives such as "a price fifteen
percent below the proposal" are too vague. If the team is considering
alternative packages, definite objectives must be established for
each possible alternative. If there are objectives other than price,
these should be clearly established as well (NFCTC, 1 985). Decisions
must also be made "as to which objectives cannot be compromised
under any circumstances, and which objectives can be compromised,
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to what extent, and in exchange for what" (Naval School of CEC
Officers, 1974, p. 25).
The negotiation team should attempt to anticipate the position
that the contractor is likely to take as well as define its own
objectives. Anticipating the contractor is difficult, but evaluating
his bargaining position is helpful. There are many important factors
to be considered. Some of these factors are:
(a) The degree of competition present.
(b) the contractor's need or desire for work.
(c) the time pressures on the government and the contractor to
obtain agreement.
(d) regulatory pressures in the form of the (FAR)and other
procurement regulations, and administrative processes.
(e) legal pressures.
(f) political pressures.
(g) public opinion as it affects the reputation of the parties
concerned. (U. S. Naval School, 1986, p. 5-20)
Evaluating the contractor's bargaining position aids the team in
organizing a strategy. Appropriate responses with backup





"An issue is a statement or an assertion about which people
differ and concerning which they take opposing sides" (NFCTC, 1985,
p. 2-11). Issues are the heart of negotiations. All information
available should be utilized to determine possible issues. The
question "where are the areas of disagreement?" Should be asked in
order to identify issues. The contractor's probable position on each
issue can then be recognized and analyzed. The Government's position
must also be established for each probable issue. An outline of the
major points of difference between the government and the
contractor, including evidence supporting the issues, can be
extremely helpful. Analyzing and organizing the cost and profit
elements will provide the negotiating team with valuable supporting
information at a glance (NFCTC, 1985).
Developing Alternatives
Reaching an agreement in negotiations is not an end in itself.
People negotiate in order to improve their present situation. Leaving
a negotiation with less than one entered is not uncommon. People are
often more dedicated to reaching an agreement than to minimizing
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their losses. If an alternative to a negotiated solution is not
developed, pessimism about what might happen if negotiations came
to a halt is high. The tendency is to finish the negotiation no matter
what the cost. Developing alternatives to a negotiated agreement
gives a standard by which to measure any proposed agreement. By
using a standard, one can guard against rejecting an agreement which
would be in one's best interest as well as guard against a poor
agreement (Fisher & Ury, 1 981 ; Shea, 1 983). Fisher and Ury (1 981
)
call this standard "one's Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement
(BATNA) ."
The relative power of opposing negotiators is determined by the
attractiveness of each person's option of not reaching agreement.
Developing possible BATNAs involves creating a list of actions
through brainstorming or other techniques, developing the more
promising ideas into practical options, and, selecting and testing the
best option. If several good options are developed, focus should be on
the best and strongest. It may be so strong that negotiations are not
necessary in order to be satisfied. One's relative power is suddenly
immense (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Shea, 1983).
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The contractor's alternatives to a negotiated agreement should
also be considered. He may be overly optimistic about his options.
Enjoying the advantages of lowering his expectations would be
possible only if his alternatives were known. If both sides have
attractive BATNAs, the best alternative for both parties may be to
not negotiate. Mutual satisfaction may be better obtained through an
agreement to part ways (Fisher & Ury, 1981).
Having a viable alternative to a negotiated agreement, and
knowing its attractiveness, gives one the option of walking away and
the knowledge to decide when. The capacity to halt negotiations
gives one self-confidence and greater power to affect the outcome
(Fisher & Ury, 1 981 ; Shea, 1 983).
Advance planning is highly desirable, but strategy must remain
flexible. The negotiating team must be alert for the inevitable
unexpected developments which occur during negotiations. It should
then adjust its strategy accordingly.
Strategic Factors
Three factors which should be given prime consideration when
developing negotiation strategy are the location and climate of the
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negotiation, the timing of the negotiation, and the agenda. Their
impact on the outcome of negotiations is significant.
Location and Climate
Whenever possible, negotiations should be performed at the
government contract office. The person who controls the negotiating
environment increases his negotiating power. This is the reason a
real estate agent likes to put a client in his car rather than let the
client drive. When the agent is driving he has control over where the
client goes, what is seen, and when it is seen (Harris, 1983; Dawson,
1985; Nierenberg, 1971 ; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
The job site may be a better place for negotiations if debate
over site conditions could become a major issue. However this may
prove to be impractical because of the lack of adequate facilities. A
preliminary fact-finding conference at the site would be nearly as
useful and far more practical. In addition to the psychological
advantages like power, conducting negotiations at the government
contract office has other positive aspects. The pressures of time are




authority is available in the event of an impasse (Dawson, 1985; U. S.
Naval School, 1986).
The physical surroundings can have direct impact on the
outcome of the negotiations. The atmosphere can be made peaceful
which tends to have a calming effect on a contractor, or it can be
made as uncomfortable as possible in an effort to rush him into
stating his lowest price. However, personal discomfort resulting
from uncomfortable chairs, bright sunlight, cigar smoke, or an
overheated room can turn an otherwise level-headed and cooperative
discussion into an acrimonious, heated debate. Note that while it may
occur, artificial manipulations to discomfort the opposition are
unethical and frequently counterproductive. Spacious rooms with
proper lighting, comfortable chairs, and a controlled comfortable
environment will produce the best overall results. Supplies like
calculators, pencils, paper, and a blackboard should also be readily
available to the contractor. A separate conference room with a phone
is also helpful to the contractor, but government offices are typically
short on space. Arranging the conference room and its atmosphere are
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an integral part of the negotiation process (Harris, 1983; Dawson,
1985; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
Timing
Timing is important in negotiations of prime contracts as well
as change orders. Negotiations that are performed before sufficient
information is available handicap the government and the contractor.
Without sufficient information, establishing accurate price data is
impossible. This forces the contractor to raise his estimate for
protection against unforeseen costs. The government will be equally
unable to determine the contractor's costs, and may accept an
unreasonably high price (Naval School of CEC Officers, 1974; U. S.
Naval School, 1986).
On the other hand, prolonging negotiations to the point where
the work is delayed or the contractor's proposal is no longer valid is
not wise either. When agreement is not foreseen in the near future
and further delay is not in the Government's best interest, the
contractor may be authorized to proceed before a final price has been
agreed upon. This is done through a letter contract or a unilateral
notice to proceed for prime contracts or change orders to existing
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contracts respectively. A unilateral notice to proceed is also known
as a unpriced change order. There are serious drawbacks to these
techniques. Once a letter contract is awarded, the contractor is in
control. It is no longer feasible for the government to terminate the
contractor and award to another. The contractor also has more time
to accumulate cost data, and his financial risk is minimized since he
is assured of receiving at least the amount of the predetermined
ceiling. Realizing this, he may be less apt to make concessions during
negotiations, and he may even prolong negotiations. Similarly,
negotiating change orders after the work has begun transfers the cost
risk from the contractor to the government and makes negotiations
difficult. A notice to proceed also may create a
cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost pricing situation, which is forbidden
by statute. For these reasons, it is NAVFACENGCOM policy to avoid
the use of letter contracts and notices to proceed whenever possible
(NAVFACENGCOM, 1985; Naval School of CEC Officers, 1974; U. S.
Naval School, 1986).
Authorizing a contractor to begin work before a final price has
been agreed upon has other disadvantages. The value of services
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tends to change rapidly after those services have been performed
(Dawson, 1 985). Whether the value increases or decreases depends
on which side of the negotiating table you are on. Once the work is
performed, or is in the progress, the contractor remembers well the
unforeseen difficulties and costs incurred. The customer, who
desperately needed the work performed immediately and was willing
to pay top dollar, now has the product and does not understand how it
could cost so much. The customer's problem is solved and the
contractor has more problems and costs than he estimated. When
negotiating for the customer under these circumstances, it can be
extremely difficult to arrive at a price viewed as fair and reasonable
by both parties.
Agenda
An agenda can provide the control required to ensure effective
negotiations. The agenda defines the issues and helps to confine
discussions to what is important and relevant. This plan can be
designed to play a specific role in negotiations. For example, agenda
items in labor negotiations are often organized so that the most
difficult subjects of discussion occur at the exact time of a strike
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vote. An agenda can also facilitate agreement by arranging the less
controversial items for the beginning of the discussion. This
generates a climate of success that may continue throughout the
negotiations. An agenda can clarify or hide motives. It can establish
rules that are fair or biased. It can keep talks on track or permit
digression (Brooks & Odiorne, 1984; Jandt, 1985; Nierenberg, 1971 ; U.
S. Naval School, 1986). "The man who controls the agenda controls
what will be said and, perhaps more important, what will not be said"
(Jandt, 1985, p. 5).
The agenda should contain items that both sides want to
discuss, not just the government's interests. Otherwise, negotiations
for the day may consist only of what items will be discussed and at
what point. This can be easily accomplished by contacting the
contractor prior to meeting to determine what areas he wants to
discuss. Once this consideration is given, debate over the agenda is
unlikely.
The strategy of including "straw" points may be helpful to the
government. The team can maintain a position on these points of little
or no importance until a concession is needed to promote an attitude
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of cooperation by the government and success by the contractor (U. S.
Naval School, 1986).
Chester L. Karrass (1974a) recommends that if the other party
is the author, negotiate the agenda before talks begin. He provides
the following guidelines:
(a) Don't accept the other man's agenda without thinking through
the consequences, (b) consider where and how issues can best be
introduced, (c) schedule the discussion of issues to give
yourself time to think, (d) study the opponents' proposed agenda
for what it leaves out, (e) be careful not to imply that your
"must" demands are negotiable. You can show your resolve early
by not permitting such items into discussion, (p. 5,6)
An agenda is a plan, not a contract. Neither party can afford to
not change what he does not like. An agenda provides control which
should not be taken for granted, neither by the drafter or his opponent
(Jandt, 1985; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
Negotiating Team
The negotiating team approach to developing and carrying out
strategy has proven to be very successful. For Navy negotiations
which meet certain criteria, based on dollar threshold, and type of
negotiation, the team is called a Contract Award and Review Board
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(NAVFACENGCOM, 1985). However, whether negotiating a small
change order or a major contract, a well managed team gives the
government the maximum advantage to reach its goals. The success
of the team is determined primarily by its size, leadership, expertise,
and preparation (Brooks & Odiorne, 1984 ; Harris, 1983;
NAVFACENGCOM, 1985).
Theoretically, the ideal size of a negotiating team is one. This
avoids the problems of control, collaboration, and communication
present in groups. But there is often the need to have more
information and expertise available than one person possesses. The
contracting officer, as the leader, must choose the team membership
carefully. Depending on the dollar value involved and the overall
importance of the negotiation, team membership may include price
analysts, design engineers, auditors, and legal advisors. However, the
number of team members should be limited, for all negotiations, to
four or five persons. More members than this creates span of control
difficulties for the leader (Harris, 1983; Scott, 1981).
The contracting officer has overall responsibility, but the team
members have advisory responsibilities concerning topics in their
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area of expertise and must be utilized to the greatest extent possible.
This is possible if the members can conform to two requirements.
The first requirement is that each member must understand and be in
complete agreement with the group's goal, and be willing to put the
group's goals before their own. The second requirement is that the
members must be dedicated to the methods of accomplishing the
team's goals. They must realize that the team leader is the only one
that negotiates with the contractor. If any member is allowed to
voice his ideas and emotions any time he feels like it, effective
negotiation will be impossible. A board member may voice an idea or
comment contrary to the entire strategy of the Board in the heat of
debate. The main function of the team members during the
negotiation is to sit, listen, evaluate, and act when called upon by the
leader. More active roles may be played; for example certain
strategies may call for all members to play an active role. But for
the most part team members should participate in the conversation
only when the leader specifically asks them to. Notes to the leader
may be passed, but only if very indiscreetly in order to avoid
distracting others. All statements directly or indirectly committing
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the Navy must be the exclusive responsibility of the team leader. The
leader must continually exercise positive control to ensure effective
communications and to present a unified front. He should never
hesitate to call a recess if one is necessary to regain control of the
team, or of the negotiation (Harris, 1983; NFCTC, 1985; Scott, 1981
;
U.S. Naval School, 1986).
The team must do its homework in order to be effective.
Thorough research is necessary to familiarize the team with all
aspects of the proposal including scope of work and pricing. The
strengths and weaknesses of the proposal should be analyzed and
discussed by all members. A list of questions should be prepared to
help identify the contractor's likely strategy and tactics (Graham &
Yoshihiro, 1984; Johnston, 1985).
Simulation or practice sessions are also very helpful. Someone
with knowledge of the contract should review the proposal and play
the role of devil's advocate. This person should try to anticipate the
actions and alternatives available to the contractor and act them out.
This technique allows the team to see the proposal from the
contractor's point of view and provides training in negotiating.
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Mistakes made in practice sessions cost nothing and can be corrected.
Mistakes made at the negotiating table may be extremely costly
(Johnston, 1985).
Truth-in-Negotiations Act (Public Law 87-653)
Price and cost analysis is an important step in preparation for
negotiations. On the advice of the Comptroller General, Congress
enacted Public Law 87-653 (Naval School of CEC Officers, 1974).
This law, enacted in 1962, is also known as the Truth-in-Negotiations
Act. The purpose of this law is to provide safeguards for the
government against inflated cost estimates in negotiated contracts
and subcontracts (Naval School of CEC Officers, 1974 p28).
Under certain circumstances, contracting officers are required
to obtain cost or pricing data from offerors and the offerors are
required to provide this information in support of cost proposal(Naval
School of CEC Officers, 1974). The purpose of obtaining this data is
to enable the government to analyze contractor's proposals when no
other reliable method is available. Certification that the cost and
pricing data supporting the contractor's proposal is accurate,
complete, and current is required in the following circumstances:
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(a) Prior to the award of any negotiated contract where the price is
expected to exceed $100,000; (b) prior to the negotiation of any
contract modification when the price adjustment is expected to
exceed $1 00,000; (c) prior to the award of a subcontract at any tier
where each higher subcontractor and the prime contractor have been
required to furnish the certified cost or pricing data, and the price of
the subcontract is expected to exceed $100,000; and (d) prior to the
modification of any subcontract covered by (c) when the price
adjustment is expected to exceed $100,000 (FAR, 1986 ; Naval School
of CEC Officers, 1974; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
This cost and pricing data also can be required for actions
between $25,000 and $1 00,000. However, the case for this would be
highly unusual and would require justification by the contracting
officer (U. S. Naval School, 1986). Certified cost or pricing data shall
not be requested by the contracting officer for actions less than
$25,000 in accordance with the FAR (1986).
The contractor is required to submit the proposal on a standard
government form, SF1411 (FAR, 1986). The proposal must be
complete enough to allow an auditor to verify cost data (FAR, 1986).
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For example, the contractor must list a quotation from a particular
steel company, showing the quantity and price of the steel required.
The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) will verify this
information when the contractor's books are audited. Once the
proposal is received from the contractor, the members of the
government contracting office verify that the work to be performed is
accurately reflected. The proposal is then forwarded to DCAA for
audit. The DCAA performs an advisory audit which attempts to
substantiate the contractor's direct cost, subcontractor's quotations,
wages paid to tradesmen, and the basis for overhead (NAVFACENGCOM,
1 985). It is the contracting officer's responsibility to determine
reasonableness of the number of manhours, material quantity, and
equipment requirements (NAVFACENGCOM, 1985). This information is
used as a basis for negotiations, but does not relieve the government
of the responsibility for preparing an independent estimate
(NAVFACENGCOM, 1985; FAR, 1986).
The contractor's data must be accurate, complete and current.
If, after contract award or issue of a change, the data is found to be
defective, the government has the right to a price adjustment.
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However, it must be proven that the contractor failed to disclose
significant and available cost or pricing data and that such failure
resulted in an excessive cost to the govemment(FAR, 1986; Rusher,
1 981 ). To establish that the contractor did not act in good faith
would require monumental effort, and may prove to be impossible.
Proposals inevitably include judgements by the contractor
concerning future costs or projections (NFCTC, 1985). If all proposal
information were entirely factual, there would be no need for
negotiations. These judgements are supported by factual data in the
proposal, but in no way is the contractor making representations as to
the accuracy of judgements concerning future costs or projections.
This distinction between fact and judgement is important as it
defines a major area for negotiations. The Truth-in-Negotiations Act
provides the government with more data with which to negotiate, but
the final price is still left open for bargaining (U. S. Naval School,
1986; Naval School of CEC Officers, 1974; NFCTC, 1985).
There are four exemptions from submission of the cost and
pricing data required by the Truth-in-Negotiations Act (FAR, 1986).
The contracting officer shall not require certification when it is
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determined that prices are; (a) based on adequate price competition,
(b) based on established catalog or market prices of commercial
items sold in substantial quantities to the general public, or (c) set
by law or regulations such as for utilities (FAR, 1986). Exemption is
also allowed by waiver from the Secretary of the Navy (Naval School






Having thoroughly prepared, the negotiating team is almost
ready to engage in actual negotiations. But before negotiations begin,
the process of opening the negotiation must be considered, and the
stages of negotiation analyzed.
The Opening Process
The opening of the conference is an influential phase of
negotiations (Winkler, 1984). The pattern and possibilities of
negotiations will be established in the first few moments of meeting.
In order to take full advantage of this period one must look at why
this period is so influential, the purpose of the opening, and how the
objectives of the negotiations are influenced by the opening
procedures.
The opening of the conference is a critical period because of its
influence on the entire negotiating process and results (Scott, 1981).
Energy and concentration are at a natural high point. Everyone is
concentrating. A long monologue at this time will lose everyone's




opening as well as what is said can significantly influence the
success of negotiations (Scott, 1981, Shea, 1983; Winkler, 1984).
The opening's purpose is to develop understanding, interest, and
support (Scott, 1981). It is the responsibility of the host team
leader, usually the government team leader, to open the conference
(NFCTC, 1985). The opening statement should consist of background
information which defines the problem or nature of the negotiation
topic, the principles and objectives of the meeting, and the procedure
for reaching these objectives (Shea, 1983, U. S. Naval School, 1986).
"The opening statement can determine whether the meeting will be
orderly and productive or confused and misguided" (NFCTC, 1985, p.
3-2).
The opening procedure influences the team's ability to achieve
its negotiation objectives. The procedure is not restricted to
thoughts and actions which occur while sitting at the negotiating
table. Many factors influential to the negotiation process and results
must be considered before negotiations begin. Punctuality, personal
appearance, avoidance of interruptions, and setting the stage develop
the meeting's climate (U. S. Naval School, 1986). When handled
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correctly, these factors can create a cordial, cooperative, and
businesslike atmosphere (NFCTC, 1985, Scott, 1981, Shea, 1983, U. S.
Naval School, 1986).
The government, most commonly the host, must ensure that all
members are prompt. Ideally all government members will arrive
before the contractor. This shows professionalism and respect for
the contractor's time. A contractor kept waiting is not likely to be
cooperative, especially if he has traveled a long distance. Tardiness
may also be used to gain advantage (U. S. Naval School, 1986). If the
contractor is late it may be to the team's advantage to indicate its
displeasure either directly or by mild inference. The contractor can
also attempt to use the Government's tardiness as a tactic to irritate
or obligate. A countermeasure to this is to ignore his attempt or
indicate it makes no difference to the team (NFCTC, 1985, Scott,
1981, Shea, 1983, U. S. Naval School, 1986).
Personal appearance is an essential part of gaining the mutual
respect which is the foundation of successful negotiations (NFCTC,
1 985). All members must present a neat and well groomed
appearance. The military members on the team should wear their
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uniform, a universal symbol of respect and authority (NFCTC, 1985;
U. S. Naval School, 1986).
Outside interruptions of the meeting must be kept to a minimum
and avoided entirely when possible (NFCTC, 1985). Interruptions are
irritating and disruptive, even if they pertain directly to the
negotiation. Similarly, it is essential, but not always practical, that
team members "clear their calendars" for the periods immediately
prior to and after the meeting. This allows members to arrive on
time, concentrate on the subject of the meeting, and not be rushed to
adjourn in order to attend another meeting. Conversely, if the
contractor is concentrating on other matters and hurried by other
commitments the team should be aware and take advantage. He may
be willing to accept many of the team's demands just to bring the
conference to a close (NFCTC, 1985; Winkler, 1984).
Setting the stage refers to the formalities which must be
attended to and the process of establishing a favorable negotiating
base immediately prior to the negotiations (U. S. Naval School, 1986).
The formalities include greetings and introductions. Establishing a
foundation involves setting ground rules, establishing power and
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authority, and creating a sense of objectivity and fairness (NFCTC,
1985; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
Introduce all team members by their full name and title, with
emphasis on their expertise and experience, when favorable. This
should be done before the conference begins or at the very beginning
(NFCTC, 1985). Pleasant greetings and an expression of appreciation
for punctuality and attendance are helpful (NFCTC, 1985; U. S. Naval
School, 1986).
Establishing the negotiating authority of the opponent's team
leader is important (U. S. Naval School, 1986). If the contractor's
representative does not have the authority to bind the contractor,
successful negotiation becomes impossible. Frustration will
dominate the climate if every time a final decision must be made the
other side tries to hide behind "it looks good to me but my boss has
final approval" or "I could never get my boss to agree to that!" Under
these circumstance the contractor's representative is nothing more
than a messenger boy and the team can not negotiate with him
seriously (NFCTC, 1985; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
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The team leader can create a sense of objectivity and fairness
through his opening remarks (NFCTC, 1985). It should be stressed
that although both sides will be striving to obtain the most favorable
deal possible, it is not in the interest of either party to enter into an
agreement that is obviously unfair or prejudicial to the interests of
the other (U. S. Naval School, 1986). It is important that the
contractor know he is dealing with someone who is honest and whose
word can be relied on. The contractor should be assured of the
Government's intention to make every effort to be objective and its
expectation of the contractor to do the same, emphasizing that only
then will it be possible to work out a mutually acceptable agreement
(NFCTC, 1985; U. S. Naval School, 1986; Winkler, 1984).
Phases of Negotiation
At this point in the negotiating process, a cordial, cooperative,
and businesslike atmosphere has been established for reaching the
team's objectives. Tensions have been eased and the members are in a
positive frame of mind. The major issues and objectives must now be
established with certainty (Dawson, 1985). Assumptions must be
examined (NFCTC, 1985). Current, more complete, information must
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be gathered about the other party (NFCTC, 1985). Finally, a mutually
satisfactory agreement must be sought and hopefully obtained
(Dawson, 1985; NFCTC, 1985; Scott, 1981; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
The period of negotiation which begins as the members sit down
at the negotiating table can be separated into two phases, exploratory
and agreement . In the exploratory phase, assumptions are examined,
issues and objectives are clarified and information about the
contractor is gathered (Dawson, 1985). The agreement, or
negotiation, phase includes battling for position, concessions, and
final agreement (Dawson, 1985; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
Exploratory Phase
As many assumptions as possible must be validated during the
exploratory phase. The negotiating team's price objectives, its
diagnosis of the issues, and its strategies are based upon preliminary
information obtained from the contractor's proposal or various other
sources (U. S. Naval School, 1986). It is risky to rely on this
information as factual, and may be costly (NFCTC, 1985).
The contractor's position must also be established (Harris,
1 983). The issues and objectives that are important to him must be

57
discovered. Once it is known what will satisfy the contractor, it will
be much easier to satisfy him while bargaining to the Government's
advantage. If the issues and objectives are not well defined, much
unnecessary negotiating may occur. Fisher and Ury, in Getting to Yes
(1981), relate a story of two sisters who quarreled over an orange.
Eventually the sisters divided the orange in half. One sister ate the
fruit from her half and threw the peel away. The other sister threw
away the fruit of her half and used the peel in baking a cake. Failure
to define the issues and objectives, or more simply the problem, lead
to needless negotiations and arguments, and a poor solution (Fisher &
Ury, 1 981 ). Information that may not have anything to do with the
contractor's demands or objectives should also be gathered (NFCTC,
1985). Who is this person? What motivates him to make his
demands? This "unrelated" information may help the government
tailor its strategies to better meet the contractor's objectives, and
therefore its own (Dawson, 1985; Jandt, 1985; NFCTC, 1985; U. S.
Naval School, 1986). The method for reaching the many goals of the
exploratory phase is questioning, "pointed and unflagging
inquisitiveness" (U. S. Naval School, 1986, p. 5-25).
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Questions and discussions of the exploratory phase should be
planned on the basis of reaching the goals just mentioned.
Inconsistencies between information gathered from government
sources and that received from the contractor should be specifically





listening (Dawson, 1985; U. S. Naval School, 1986). Care should be
taken that the questioning does not lead to argumentation. This would
destroy the purpose of the exploratory session; to gain information
(Dawson, 1985; NFCTC, 1985; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
When questioning, the team should not be satisfied with vague
or guarded answers. Most contractors are aware that the less
specific the knowledge of the government team, the more easily their
judgement can be influenced. A contractor may pass over a vulnerable
point by presenting an abundance of information to misdirect the
team's thinking or by making sweeping generalizations which , in
themselves, are true but are not pertinent to the point at hand. For
example, in defending his estimate for roofing a building, the
contractor may continually say, "roofing costs are more expensive
than ever before for everybody." This statement may be true, but it
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does not tell the team what it needs to know. The team must
determine if the costs are higher, why, and by how much. These
answers can by found by probing (Dawson, 1985; Jandt, 1985; NFCTC,
1985; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
Probing is a technique where a series of questions concerning
the same subject matter is asked (U. S. Naval School, 1986). Each
successive question digs in deeper in an attempt to pry an adequate
answer. If an answer is not satisfactory, the question can be asked in
another way or even postponed awhile and asked again. The process
should be continued until an adequate answer is received or the
contractor explains why an adequate answer is not being given
(Dawson, 1985; Jandt, 1985; NFCTC, 1985; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
Active listening, or rephrasing the contractor's point, improves
understanding (U. S. Naval School, 1986). By rephrasing the point and
asking whether one's understanding is correct avoids differences of
interpretation and also commits the contractor to an interpretation.
This also prevents the contractor from later changing his
interpretation to his advantage (NFCTC, 1985).
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It must be remembered by all members of the team that the
exploratory session is strictly exploratory. It is tempting to counter
a contractor's position during the questioning period. Suddenly, in the
middle of fact-finding, the team finds itself in the midst of
negotiating. Much needed information has not been obtained, and
organization and strategy are destroyed. The hours of planning and
preparation can be wasted if this stage is not restricted to
exploration (Dawson, 1985; NFCTC, 1985).
The exploratory phase should not close until all assumptions
have been tested, issues and objectives are clarified and their
relative importance to the contractor is established, and the basis for
the contractor's position on these is determined. When these goals
are accomplished, a recess should be called to reassess the
Government's positions, issues, and strategy (NFCTC, 1985; Scott,
1981).
Agreement Phase
The agreement session, the final phase, is the most crucial of
the performance phases (Dawson, 1985). The exploratory phase has
been completed and both parties are ready to forge an agreement that
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satisfies their needs. The dilemma is finding the option that will
satisfy both parties, or at least one that both parties will agree to.
Each side has its own range of acceptable solutions. If the two
ranges overlap as agreement is approached, a solution acceptable to
both parties may be found. The goal of negotiations is to find the
point where each side believes it has gained more than it has yielded.
In order to reach agreement, movement towards this point is
necessary. Ideally this movement will be done by the other side.




and concessions (NFCTC, 1985).
Domination is the use of all advantages to win victory over the
contractor (NFCTC, 1985). The team's attitude is one of stubbornness
and of victory at the expense of the contractor. All movement is
expected to be done by the contractor. The strategy is to emphasize
and attack the contractor's weaknesses, taking advantage where
possible, in order to build strength. This method is often used by sole
source contractors because of their position of economic strength.
The government may also be put in the position to use this approach
when it is the only buyer of the contractor's product. Domination
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requires sacrifice by the contractor, which does not result in a fair
and reasonable agreement. Victory may be sweet for the moment, but
this method of negotiation gives poor long term results. A contractor
who has been taken advantage of will be looking to even the score,
either during performance of the current contract or at the
negotiating table of future contracts (NFCTC, 1985).
Compromise involves moving toward agreement on the basis of
arbitrary position changes (NFCTC, 1985). The result may be an
agreement where neither party is satisfied. An example of an
arbitrary position change is splitting the difference. This often
happens when one or both of the negotiators is tired and is in a rush
to come to an agreement. The agreement which results from this
movement has no justification, at least not a justification that is
based on the issues and objectives as it should be. An agreement
reached by compromise is looked upon with suspicion and disapproval
because of its arbitrary basis (NFCTC, 1985).
The preferred approach for moving toward agreement in
government contracting is the concessions method (NFCTC, 1985).
Making concessions is based on a reason and justification for every
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change in position. The negotiators concentrate on giving the other
side justification for changing as well as on selling their own
position. Concession is then the process of yielding to superior
points of reason (NFCTC, 1985). Each side offers its reasons for
position changes which provides the forum for finding a mutually
satisfying agreement. Under these circumstances, yielding positions
is not a sign of weakness or of being arbitrary. Changes in position
are justified by the method of negotiation they are based upon,
concession (NFCTC, 1985).
There are many roads to reaching an agreement. The road taken





MENTAL ATTITUDE AND APPROACH
Introduction
One's mental attitude and method of approach to negotiations
can effect the outcome as much as preparation and strategy combined
(Karrass, 1974b). Philosophies of negotiating are numerous and
varied. These pages will cover the most relevant philosophies, and
methods of approaching negotiations with these philosophies in mind.
The importance of high aspirations in negotiations has been
proven in scientific experiments (Karrass, 1985; Karrass, 1970). At
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration researchers
conducted an experiment with hundreds of people (Karrass, 1985).
The purpose was to determine whether those people who aim higher
get better results from negotiations. The people negotiated two at a
time-one coming in one door, the other coming in the other door.
Instructions to the bargainers in the experiment were identical, with
the exception of the negotiation results expected of them. Half were
told the typical negotiator in their position got $7.50 and the other
half believed $2.50. The result was not an overall average of $5.00 as
might be expected. Those that aimed for $7.50 received about that.
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Those who aimed for $2.50 got about $2.50. In an experiment done by
Chester L. Karass, phD (1970), 120 professional negotiators were
paired off to negotiate a lawsuit (Karrass, 1970). Those who aimed
for settlement of $700,000 or more averaged $650,000. Those who
aimed for less than a $700,000 settlement averaged only $425,000.
High aspirations give high results .
Negotiations should not be approached too seriously (Dawson,
1985). If one cares too much, he puts himself under unnecessary
pressure and stress. The worst person one can negotiate for is
himself. Approaching negotiations as if one's life will end or job will
be lost if results are not satisfactory is handicapping. When one
negotiates for someone else, he tends to be more objective and
relaxed (Dawson, 1985). Negotiations can be approached as a
challenging game, with superior results. A positive attitude will
reflect a resulting feeling of power and confidence. Stress will be
lower and energy higher. Doing one's best is a must, but worrying
about the outcome can lose the battle before it begins (Cohen, 1980).
The Navy negotiator has the advantage of negotiating for
someone else, the government. With the right attitude, the Navy
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negotiator can have a distinct advantage over a contractor who must
negotiate for himself. The contractor who cannot step back for an
objective view would be wise to hire an impartial negotiator (Cohen,
1980).
Communication
Negotiation is the process of communicating for the purpose of
reaching agreement. One's approach to communication can
significantly effect the outcome of negotiations. Communicating is
difficult even for those with similar backgrounds and values.
Communications between persons who not only do not know each
other, but may also feel hostile and suspicious of one another,
compounds the problem. Fisher and Ury (1981) divide communication







Negotiators sometimes give up in their attempts to persuade the
other side out of frustration in not reaching their goals. They resort
to merely trying to impress third parties or their own team. "Rather
than trying to dance with their negotiating partner toward a mutually
agreeable outcome, they try to trip him up" (Fisher & Ury, 1981, p.
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33). This playing to the gallery is wasted effort. There is more
effort put into impressing third parties than into convincing the
opposing party to take a constructive step towards agreement (Fisher
&Ury, 1981).
Paying attention to exactly what the other person is saying is
difficult, but necessary for effective negotiating. The tendency is to
think about what one is going to say next, what strategy should be
used next, or what the rest of the team is thinking, rather than to
listen attentively to the other side. Without hearing what the other
side is saying, there can be no communication (Fisher & Ury, 1981).
Misunderstanding is the third communication problem. Hearing
the other person's words are only part of understanding his meaning.
Misinterpretation is common because every word means something a
little different to each person. It is important to understand what is
meant by the words, not just what is said (Fisher & Ury, 1 981 ).
Much can be done to mitigate these communication problems.
Active listening is an easy but very effective communication
technique. Paying close attention with an occasional interruption to
say, "Do I correctly understand that you are saying...?" will aid
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understanding. It will also give the other side the satisfaction of
knowing they were heard and understood. This is a cheap but powerful
concession. Knowing he was understood, will encourage him to listen
rather than concentrate on how to get his point across. Repeating in a
positive manner what one understands the other party to mean is an
effective negotiating tool. Unless the other party believes that their
point of view is understood perfectly, they will not be receptive to
other viewpoints. Understanding the other party and the merits of
their arguments is not agreeing with them; it is the path to mutual
agreement (Fisher & Ury, 1981).
Speaking to be understood by the other party is important to
effective communication. A negotiation is not a debate or trial. The
only ones who need to be persuaded are the opposing party. Blaming a
problem on another person, name calling, or raising one's voice may
impress spectators or other team members, but it will not help the
opposing party to understand one's point of view (Fisher & Ury, 1981).
Non-aggressive "I" statements are more effective in
communicating disagreement than offensive "you" statements.
Describing a problem in terms of its impact on oneself is more

69
persuasive than in terms of what the other person did or why. Saying,
"that is not what I understood you to mean" is much less offensive
than "you lied to me." The same information is conveyed. Offensive
statements promote anger and direct attention away from the goal of
agreement, rather than promote communications (Fisher & Ury, 1981).
Ethics
The highest standards of personal conduct are expected of all
government personnel because of their position of public trust. The
business ethics of government personnel who administrate and expend
government funds "must be above reproach" (U. S. Naval School, 1986,
p. 5-29). However this does not mean that one must naively approach
each negotiation with all the cards showing (Cohen, 1980;Dawson,
1985).
Walking the fine line between ethics and good negotiating skills
is not easy. A frame of reference is crucial to determining whether
actions are ethical. A good negotiator is not unethical if he uses his
negotiating skills against another experienced player. But when
"Honest John" at the car dealership uses those same tactics against
"Grandma Smith", he is being unethical. People should be dealt with
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based on their frame of reference. Taking advantage of someone is
unethical, but allowing others to take advantage is not upholding one's
position of public trust (Cohen, 1980; Dawson, 1985; Winkler, 1984).
Good negotiators do not reveal all of their hand. They do not tell
the complete story of what they want or why they want it. Doing so
would encourage the other party to take advantage and push for
maximum concessions. Instead they reveal information in small
pieces, and only when necessary. The smart negotiator will not
reveal the pressures he is working under, deadlines, or any other
information which will give advantage to the other person. This does
not make him a liar or cheat. It is only prudent to protect one's
position (Cohen, 1980; Dawson, 1985; Winkler, 1984).
A negotiator must maintain his integrity. His word must be as
binding as a signed contract. If the other party distrusts the
negotiator he becomes nervous and suspicious. Concessions are
nearly impossible in a distrustful atmosphere. Suspicious people do





The purpose of negotiation is to reach an economic agreement
where each side believes it has gained more than it has yielded
(Jandt, 1985; NFCTC, 1985; Rusher, 1981). This is possible only
because different people value things differently. Additionally, each
negotiator has his own needs, wants and motivators. Intangibles such
as ego, company goals, and innate competitiveness complicate the
path to agreement, but they also provide the possibility that both
sides can walk away from the negotiating table a winner. In a
win-win negotiation, the goal is to find a solution that provides
acceptable gain to all parties (Jandt, 1985).
Why is win-win negotiating desirable? Most people have been
taught to strive for victory, sometimes at all costs. The extremists
may adopt the philosophy of the late football coach, Vince Lombardi,
who said, "Winning isn't everything, it's the only thing" (Scott, 1981).
By this standard, there is only one satisfied person, the winner.
However, there are hidden hazards to winning in contract negotiations
if the other party feels that they are the loser. The loser may feel
offended, injured, or wronged. The loser may avoid future dealings or
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even seek to "get even" for the loss. The winner has won a battle but
he may lose the war.
Aside from the pragmatic reasons, there are ethical reasons to
strive for a win-win negotiation (Jandt, 1985). Winning at all costs
jeopardizes the Government's requirement for standards "above
reproach". This "cutthroat" attitude is also in conflict with the
personal ethics of many, and may leave them feeling like a loser no
matter what the negotiation results (U. S. Naval School, 1986, p.
5-29).
Satisfying the other party, as well as oneself, is a goal of
win-win negotiating (Jandt, 1985; Karrass, 1985). People's real
needs are seldom what they seem to be, because the negotiators try
to conceal them or do not recognize them. Underneath the discussions
of price, products, services, money, or whatever, there are
psychological needs (Jandt, 1985; Karrass, 1985). These can be
satisfied by the proper approach to negotiations. A person's manner,
tone of voice, attitude, methods, and concern for the other side,
contribute to meeting the other parties needs (Jandt, 1985; Karrass,




meet some of the other parties needs. Principled negotiation is
Fisher and Ury's (1981) process for win-win negotiations (Cohen,
1980; Fisher & Ury, 1981).
Roger Dawson (1985) established five standards to help
determine not only whether a negotiation was won or lost, but how
the game was played. These can be used to judge negotiations for
win-win results.
The first standard is apparent; does everyone involved consider
himself a winner? If the other party leaves the negotiation table
thinking they have been talked out of everything, it has not been a
good negotiation. Both parties should feel that they have
accomplished something important and satisfying.
The second benchmark is the feeling that both sides have each
listened to and considered the objectives of the other. This concern
for the other parties' needs creates an atmosphere of communication
in which a win-win settlement can be reached.
The belief that each side conducted negotiations fairly is the
third standard of judgement. Playing by the rules prevents the feeling
of betrayal which causes negotiations to suffer. Both parties should
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leave the negotiations with the attitude that the other side was
tough, and they fought hard, but they were fair in the way they
conducted negotiations.
If each negotiator feels that he would enjoy dealing with the
other in the future, the fourth benchmark has been met. If the process
of dealing with each other was challenging and enjoyable, the
negotiations were conducted fairly and well.
The belief by each party that the other party is determined to
uphold the conditions of the agreement is the fifth standard of
judgement. If either side feels that the other will back down on his
commitments, given the opportunity, then the negotiation was not a
win-win negotiation.
Roger Dawson's (1985) accurate definition of a win-win
negotiator is a "person who can get what he wants out of a
negotiation and still bring himself up to the standards established by
those benchmarks" (p. 225). This is also true of a person who




The method of principled negotiation, developed by the Harvard
Negotiation Project, is an alternative to "hard" and "soft" positional
bargaining (Fisher & Ury, 1981). Principled negotiation is away of
deciding issues on merits rather than through threats or haggling.
Opportunities for mutual gains are explored. Where interests
conflict, results are based on objective criteria rather than who can
present the best case or hold out the longest. Principled negotiation
focuses on fairness and protection from those who would take
advantage of one's efforts to be fair (Fisher & Ury, 1981).
In positional bargaining, an extreme position is taken and
stubbornly held onto. The other party is not allowed to know one's
true views, needs, and goals. Small concessions are made only when
necessary to keep the negotiations going. When both sides behave this
way, time is spent haggling rather meeting the true needs of each
side (Jandt, 1985; Fisher & Ury, 1981).
Fisher and Ury (1981) argue that one should not bargain over
positions. Positional bargainers make demands (their positions),
argue them, and measure their success in terms of how much their
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opponents will give in to those demands. One side or the other wins.
The closest one can come to a "win-win" result is a split the
difference compromise where no one really wins. This does not meet
the goal of negotiation, a "wise agreement" (Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 4).
A "wise agreement" is one "which meets the legitimate interests of
each side to the extent possible, resolves conflicting interests fairly,
is durable, and takes community interests into account" (Fisher & Ury,
1 981
,
p. 4). Fisher and Ury (1 981 ) offer three criteria for judging any
method of negotiation; (a) "it should produce a wise agreement if
agreement is possible"; (b) "it should be efficient", and (c) "it should
improve or at least not damage the relationship between the parties"
(p. 4). Principled negotiation, as an alternative to positional
bargaining, meets these criteria.
Negotiating over positions tends to stifle creativity. "As more
attention is paid to positions, less attention is devoted to meeting
the underlying concerns of the parties" (Fisher & Ury, 1981
,
p. 5).
Agreement becomes difficult. If agreement is reached it may be a
result of splitting the difference rather than a solution designed to
skillfully meet and satisfy the legitimate interests of the parties.
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The result is neither party is as satisfied as it could have been
(Fisher & Ury, 1981).
Principled negotiation is Fisher and Ury's (1981) alternative
to positional bargaining. Their "negotiation on the merits" (Fisher &
Ury, 1 981
,
p. 11 ) has four basic parts:
(a) People: Separate the people from the problem;
(b) criteria: Insist that the result be based on some
objective standard;
(c) interests: Focus on interests, not positions;
(d) options: Generate a variety of possibilities before
deciding what to do.
Principled negotiation is not always practical, but it is a
substantial improvement over positional bargaining. Each of the four
basic parts of principled negotiation has positive and negative
aspects. Humans are emotional and often possess radically different
views. People's egos become identified with their positions (Scott,
1981). Separating the people from the problem is not always
possible. They often are the problem. Fisher and Ury's suggestions to
get the participants "to see themselves as working side by side,
attacking the problem, not each other" (Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 11), and
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"to deal with people as human beings and with the problem on its
merits" (p. 40), which are excellent suggestions.
Objective criteria "independent of the naked will of either side"
(Fisher & Ury, 1 981
,
p.1 1), such as "market value, expert opinion, or
custom or law" (Fisher & Ury, 1 981
,
p. 1 1 ) is not always available to
determine the outcome of negotiations. But using objective criteria
is another excellent idea when feasible.
Focusing on satisfying people's underlying interests, their true
interests, rather than their stated positions is the subject of the
third point. For example, when a contractor negotiating an indefinite
quantity contract insists on a certain price, why does he need that
price? Is it the risk he anticipates? Will the price be less if there
were a guaranteed minimum? Maybe allowing him to erect a storage
shed on site to reduce travel costs would satisfy him. Discovering
the contractor's motivating interests may reveal alternative
positions which satisfy eveyone's interests (Fisher & Ury, 1981).
Inventing options for mutual gain before deciding what to do
increases the chance of meeting the interests of both sides.
Negotiators often end up like the earlier example of the sisters who
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quarreled over the orange. One wanted the fruit, the other the peel. If
the options had been examined, each would have had the whole fruit or
the whole peel rather than only half of each. Depersonalizing the
negotiations, substituting interests for positions, inventing options
before deciding, and searching for objective standards for solutions
can result in a productive, rewarding, and mutually satisfying
negotiation without personal attacks (Fisher & Ury, 1981). In other






Tactical planning is used to reach short-range goals.
Short-range goals are included in a larger plan, strategy. Strategy is
long-range planning concerned with obtaining long-range goals.
Tactics are the short-run methods and procedures used to reach the
long range goals of strategy (Karrass, 1970; NFCTC, 1985).
Tactics are an inherent part of negotiating. Using tactics is not
unethical or even against the theory of win-win negotiation. The
factors determining whether a tactic is ethical are how and why the
tactics are used, and of course, the ethics of the observer. Even if
one does not use tactics, it is necessary to understand the dynamics
and reasoning behind them, as well as how to counter them. Because,
whether the reader uses them or not, they will be used against him
(Dawson, 1985; Karrass, 1970; Shea, 1983).
Tactics can be divided into two areas, maneuvers and
techniques. A maneuver is a move or ploy designed to secure a
position of advantage. Techniques can be thought of as tools or
weapons in an arsenal. Time and silence are two powerful techniques.
If used properly, tactics can provide a source of power at the
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negotiating table. If used improperly, they can be counter productive
and create needless hostility (Dawson, 1985; Karrass, 1970; Karrass,
1974b).
Maneuvers
The following maneuvers are common to government/contractor
negotiations. They are arranged according to the stage of negotiation
in which they are most likely to be used.
Beginning maneuvers
You Will Have to Do Better Than That
These eight effective words "you will have to do better than
that" can be used by the government or the contractor. Immediate
pressure is applied to the receiver to do just that, better.
Demonstrated by the names this phrase is called, such as "The Vise"
(Dawson, 1985, p. 43) and "The Krunch", is power (Karrass, 1974b, p.
90). Why does it work so well? Estimating is not a science, there is
always room for improvement. Honest estimators differ in their
interpretation of work, methods of accomplishing work, and the costs
of labor, equipment and material. Profit margins can be changed.
Neither side knows the exact cost or price of a job or piece of work.
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Pressure can be applied on the other side. For an effective
countermeasure, the proper response is required. Roger Dawson's
(1985) response would be an excellent choice: "And just how much
better do I have to do?" (p. 43). This response puts the ball in the
opponent's court and defuses the pressure.
Discomfort
Negotiations should be conducted at the government office
whenever possible. However, there may be times when using the
contractors facilities is necessary. A contractor who does not view
negotiations in a win-win manner may attempt to cause discomfort
for the government representatives. The object of this discomfort
being to wear the representatives out and to lower their resistance.
The following are examples of unpleasant conditions sometimes
created to cause discomfort; (a) providing a wobbly chair, (b)
positioning the chair facing the sun, (c) cigar or cigarette smoke, (d)
personal attack, (e) constant interruptions, and (f) poor ventilation
(Karrass, 1974b). Confronting persons who employ these tactics will
usually cause them to back off. If necessary, contact the superior of
the person you are dealing with. Never accept poor treatment. It will
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only lead to increased abuse later (Dawson, 1985; Jandt, 1985;
Karrass, 1974b).
The discomfort tactic is not used by a win-win negotiator. It is
not recommended for use by government representatives. An opponent
who is made to feel uncomfortable may be aware of what is happening
and resent it. He will try to get even the first chance he gets.
The Flinch
Flinching is easy and effective. It is a visible reaction to a
quoted price or proposal (Dawson, 1985). Shock or disbelief at what
the contractor says can quickly improve one's situation. A reason for
the reaction may not even be required, especially if the contractor is
trying to determine the Government's limits by throwing out
proposals to test reactions. Defusing responses to this maneuver
would be to remain calm while the contractor gyrates in disbelief, to
act shocked at his disbelief, or even to laugh (Dawson, 1985).
Start high/low
Leave room for negotiation. Ask for more than expected, but
imply flexibility. Do not make a "take it or leave it" stance. This
position defeats the purpose of negotiations. If one begins with his
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best deal, there is no room to make concessions. Without concessions
by the government, the contractor will feel forced into a poor deal no
matter how fair the offer. There must be an atmosphere of
agreeability, otherwise one of party will leave dissatisfied (Dawson,
1985; Winkler, 1984).
Never Jump At the First Offer
People put greater value on things that are harder to come by.
If the first deal offered is accepted, the contractor will immediately
feel he made a mistake. This is true no matter how good the deal.
The contractor may even withdraw his offer. The contractor is there
to negotiate. Therefore he will not be satisfied unless negotiations
occur. Also, if his first offer exceeds the Government's goals and is
accepted immediately, someone has probably made a mistake. An
atmosphere of agreeability is important, but not to extremes. The
contractor will be far more satisfied after negotiations if he has





What if is a constructive tactic that can lead to mutual reward
(Scott, 1 981 ). Often ask such questions as,"how would the unit price
be effected if the number of buildings to be cleaned was doubled?" or
"would providing extra storage area and a private road reduce the
price any?" Questions such as these help to determine where the
contractor's interests and costs lie. This tactic is effective in
determining what is necessary to satisfy the contractor. If the
contractor uses it, all the better (Scott, 1981).
Middle maneuvers
Higher Authority
The contractor's authority to make an agreement should be
determined before any concessions are made. It is important to
distinguish between the authority to negotiate and the authority to
make an agreement. This is important because it prevents creating a
higher authority as a stalling maneuver when under pressure. Or the
higher authority, whether he exists or not, can also be be used to
improve the agreement for the contractor. If, as negotiations are
coming to a close, the contractor insists that a "higher authority"
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must approve the deal,then insist that the person be identified and
contacted immediately. However, this can be difficult if the higher
authority is more than one person such as a committee. Government
representatives can also use this tactic to their advantage: When
feeling that the agreement is not all it could be, they are also able to
fall back on "the bosses' approval is required before final agreement."
from this perspective, the negotiator who enters a negotiation as the
obvious authority for his side is at a severe disadvantage (Cohen,
1980; Dawson, 1985; Jandt, 1985).
Splitting the Difference
The following scenario will be familiar to anyone who has
negotiated formally: An agreement has almost been reached. Both
parties insist they can go no further, but there is still a difference in
price. The end is in sight. When faced with this situation, stress to
the contractor the small difference that separates the two offers and
the amount of time that has been invested in the negotiation. Repeat
this as necessary. If the contractor responds with an offer to split
the difference, do not say yes. By offering to split the difference, the
contractor has admitted that he can change his price. Thereby,
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establishing a new low price. The government is now in control and
has the opportunity to do better than fifty-fifty. If the contractor is
using this tactic, resist all temptation to say "why don't we just split
the difference". He will eventually try something else (Dawson, 1985;
Karrass, 1974b).
Trading concessions
Do not give any concessions unless a concession will be given in
return. Every time the contractor requests a concession, say, "If I do
that for you, what will I get in return?" Roger Dawson (1985) gives
three good reasons for "being so miserly in (one's) expectations" (p.
60). First, concessions that are needed may be given freely without
having to ask. The contractor not knowing the concession's
importance, since it has not been requested, leaves the government
open to request even more. The second advantage is the elevation in
value of the concession. Even when the concession is inconsequential,
a price is put on the concession and the value is increased. The final
benefit of trading "one for one" is that it stops the contractor from
constantly asking for "just one more thing". If he knows that every
time he gets something he must give something, he will think twice
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about trying to get "just a little bit more" (Dawson, 1985; Jandt,
1985).
Playing Dumb
Playing dumb can be smart. Acting dumb defuses the
competitive spirit. A competitive negotiation is impossible when one
of the parties is saying,"Gee, I am not sure. What do you think?"
Columbo, the television detective used this maneuver. He appeared so
"dumb and helpless" that the murderers took him for granted and
ended up helping him to solve the cases. Once the contractor is no
longer "fighting", he will be willing to help the "dumb, helpless"
government representative. Concessions are easier with the
competitive spirit defused. Also, while helping, the contractor may
reveal much he intended to keep hidden (Jandt, 1985; Karrass, 1974b).
If the contractor plays dumb, attempt to keep moving. Go to
other issues. Explain again later in negotiations. If he continues to
pretend ignorance, remember to remain competitive and do not help




Whenever one negotiator has a problem he will try to throw it
into the lap of his opponent, trying to force the other party to solve
the problem. This tactic may be used as a variation of the higher
authority tactic. The contractor may agree to the terms of the deal,
but claims his superior will never agree to it . He then tries for
concessions based on what his superior will agree to, putting the "hot
Potato" into his opponents lap. The contractor wants the government
to solve his problem. Getting his superior to agree is the contractor's
problem, not the Government's. The contractor's claim should be
tested. Insist on taking the problem to his superior immediately if
the contractor appears to be bluffing. Watch for the hot Potato,
whatever the problem. Refuse to let the contractor's problems
become the Government's problem (Dawson, 1985).
Ending maneuvers
The Nibble
Just as negotiations are coming to a close and everyone seems
satisfied and ready to go home, the contractor makes a request for
more concessions. This is an attempt to take advantage of the
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Government's impatience and vulnerability after a long, hard




or "quality control won't be required on this additional work,
will it?" or some other relatively small request that should have been
discussed during negotiations. This tactic is common when
negotiating change orders because the work is not as well defined as
that in the contract. The most effective response is to make the
nibbler feel slightly ashamed for using the maneuver. The tactic is
chintzy, and the contractor is probably feeling a little guilty already.
That can be used to take advantage. A smile and a remark of surprise
that he would try such a thing after negotiating so fairly to this point
should suffice. If not, be more direct. The contractor's attempts
should not be taken seriously or allowed to spoil a good deal. If he
continues to nibble, remember to ask, "if I do this for you, what will I
get in return?" Patience will wear him down. Nibbles are usually
short lived attempts to get what the nibbler calls "just one more





Deadlines can be used as a maneuver to force agreement. The
contractor may insist that he can not miss a certain plane or that the
profit is not worth the time he is spending on negotiations. If he
insists on a deadline, call his bluff. If there is no settlement by the
deadline, there are three options. Negotiations can continue; they can
be continued later; or another source can be found. If the work is a
change to an existing contract, a unilateral change can be issued for
work to begin and negotiations to continue later (Jandt, 1985; NFCTC,
1986; Scott, 1981).
Take It or Leave It
A contractor may use "take it or leave it" tactic for many
reasons. He may be trying to intimidate the government
representative. He may be bluffing. Or he may have been pushed too
far. A counter to this is to isolate and define the problem. It may be
easily solved. Or even better, set aside the issue for a moment.
Momentum can be restored by concentrating on minor points,
particularly if the government is willing to make concessions. A
recess may ease the pressure. Make small concessions. Ignoring the
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remark may work, particularly if a willingness to work towards
agreement is shown. If none of these counters work, try to negotiate
with the contractor's superior. If that does not work, there are other
sources in almost every situation (Karrass, 1974b; NFCTC, 1986).
Good Guv/Bad Guv
This maneuver is common in old detective movies as well as in
negotiations. The contractor's team opens with the bad guy doing all
the talking. He makes unreasonable demands and expects the world on
a silver platter, delivered, free of charge. He is often obnoxious and
irritating. After some time he will stop talking or even stalk out of
the negotiations with the good guy at his heels begging him to be
reasonable. Once the good guy begins to talk, his demands sound very
reasonable compared to his partner's. He is a pleasure to deal with
and may cause the government to drop their guard or to relax their
competitive spirit. An effective counter to this tactic is to relax
without arguing. Just sit and listen. When the time comes, begin
negotiations with the good guy. Otherwise, the tough demands made
softly by the good guy may seem attractive in relation to his partner's




Decoys are used as lures in hunting. The decoy gives the birds a
false sense of security. As they fly to join their feathered friends,
they are drawn into firing range. The decoy diverts attention away
from the real issue-the hunter and his gun. Using a decoy in
negotiations is playing dirty.
When using a decoy, the contractor will first raise, and then
elevate and exaggerate the importance of an issue to take attention
away from the real issue. The contractor may insist that he start
work each day two hours before the security office opens. He may
have no intention of doing so, if granted. When the time is right, he
will agree to begin work when security is there to open the site, but
only for a price. The contractor has created a bargaining chip out of
thin air. If a decoy is suspected, concentrate on the real issue and
dismiss the spurious issue without giving any concessions (Dawson,
1985; Scott, 1981; Karrass, 1974b).
Techniques
Techniques are negotiating tools. Time, and forms of non-verbal
communication such as body language and silence, can be very
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powerful if properly utilized. Learning to use these tools, as well as
to interpret and understand when others are using them, can provide a
distinct advantage for the win-win negotiator.
Time
Time is money and time is power. Time can also be one's enemy,
depending on how it is utilized. The clock cannot be controlled, but
the effects of the passage of time on negotiations can be put to one's
advantage.
Deadlines often have a significant effect on negotiations. "In
negotiating, eighty percent of the concessions will be made in the
last twenty percent of the time available to negotiate" (Dawson,
1985, p. 103). Demands made early in negotiations are often difficult
to settle because neither side is willing to make concessions. On the
other hand, the impending deadline encourages one side, or even both
sides, to make concessions. This tendency to not take action until
necessary is demonstrated in other situations as well. When do most
people file their income tax returns? Given a year to write his
master's report, when does a student start work? The most
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significant concessions and settlement actions can be expected to
occur close to deadlines (Cohen, 1980; Dawson, 1985; Scott, 1981).
Knowing someone's deadline and they not knowing yours puts
one at a great advantage. This is true even when your deadlines are
the same. The pressure of deadlines is a very strong force. The North
Vietnamese demonstrated this at the expense of the United States
during the Paris-Vietnam Peace Talks in 1968 (Cohen, 1980; Dawson,
1 985). The U.S. negotiator was placed under a great deal of time
pressure by the President of the United States and did little to
conceal this fact. Once in Paris he rented a hotel room on a week to
week basis (Cohen, 1980; Dawson, 1985). When the North Vietnamese
delegation arrived, they leased a comfortable villa for
two-and-a-half years (Cohen, 1980; Dawson, 1985). They then
proceeded to spend months discussing the shape of the negotiating
table (Cohen, 1980; Dawson, 1985). The shape of the table probably
made little or no difference to the Vietnamese, but they knew the U.S.
negotiator's deadline and a wanted to put him under as much time
pressure as possible. The tactics turned out to be extremely
effective. Just two or three days before the United States' deadline,
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there was a breakthrough in negotiations (Cohen, 1980; Dawson,
1985). Under tremendous time pressure the United States left the
negotiating table having achieved little towards their goals (Cohen,
1980; Dawson, 1985).
In spite of their nonchalant attitude, the North Vietnamese also
had a deadline (Cohen, 1980). Otherwise they would not have even
been at the negotiations. The non-chalant attitude is effective. It
works because one feels his own time constraints and believes them
to be much greater than the opponent's. The tranquility displayed
masks a great deal of stress and pressure. This is true in all
negotiation encounters (Cohen, 1980; Dawson, 1985).
In most negotiations the best strategy is to not reveal one's
true deadline unless necessary. Deadlines are the products of
negotiation and are flexible. Never blindly follow a deadline.
Carefully weigh the costs and benefits of meeting or exceeding
deadlines.
The best results cannot be achieved quickly. Very often as the
opponent's deadline approaches there will be a shift of power in one's
direction. Concessions will be made, or a creative solution will
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present itself. But these changes take time. People may not change,
but with the passage of time, circumstances can (Cohen, 1980;
Dawson, 1985).
Acceptance time is important in negotiations. This is the time
required to get use to a new idea. A proposal other than that expected
or hoped for is a new idea and requires time for acceptance. Do not
rush an opponent into accepting a proposal because they may reject it
immediately in defense. Explain the attractiveness, advantages, and
fairness to both sides and then sit quietly. Going on to other issues
for awhile or even adjourning for the day may be best. Gary Karass
(1 985), author of Negotiating To Close, wrote that his father taught
him a valuable lesson about acceptance time. He quotes his father as
saying:
My ideas are my old friends and your ideas are your friends. You
may have some very good friends. But you cannot expect me to
throw away my friends and adopt your friends at a moment's
notice, as soon as you introduce them to me. Give me time to
get used to them and I may adopt them. But I need that time-l
need that acceptance time. (Karrass, 1985, p. 115).
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Give acceptance time to the other side. If that time is handled
correctly, he may adopt your "friend."
Time has been compared to money. Both are invested, spent,
saved, and wasted. Invest time in negotiations. Use deadlines to gain
advantage. Do not rush time or opponents. In negotiating, time is
money and power.
Non-Verbal Communication
People communicate with and without words. Gestures and
movements can provide more information than words themselves to
the trained eye (Johnston, 1985). Gestures and movements are types
of body language and are an important aspect of negotiating
techniques. The ability to accurately read the feelings of others can
be a powerful negotiating tool. Another form of non-verbal
communication is silence. Silence can be a formidable weapon.
Knowing when to use silence and how to interpret it is a powerful
negotiating technique (Johnston, 1985; Karrass, 1985; Winkler, 1984).
Body Language
"More than sixty percent of all communication is non-verbal"
(Johnston, 1985; p. 10). People communicate both consciously and
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subconsciously with body language during negotiations. The ability to
accurately interpret body language can have a significant impact on
the outcome of a negotiation. Body language provides clues, not
concrete information. The situation in which body language is used
must be analyzed as well as the gesture. Interpreting body language
out of context can be harmful to one's negotiating position (Dawson,
1985; Johnston, 1985).
The term body language encompasses many means of
communication. The following are some of the fundamental types of
body language which apply to negotiations.
Negotiations usually begin and end with a handshake. It can
tell much about an opponents attitude. Many personal traits can be
discerned from a single handshake. A firm handshake indicates
self-confidence, especially when accompanied with eye-to-eye
contact (Johnston, 1985). A limp handshake may demonstrate apathy,
or the lack of power and decision making abilities (Johnston, 1985).
The person who turns his hand over, palm down, desires control and to




Smoking cigarettes is a sign of relaxation (Johnston, 1985). It
can also indicate the start or finish of the meeting (Dawson, 1985).
A person rubbing the side of his nose while talking is probably
lying or at least exaggerating (Dawson, 1985). However, a person just
touching his nose, particularly if his eyes are closed, is probably
concentrating very hard (Dawson, 1985). Rubbing or scratching the
top of one's head shows embarrassment or discomfort (Dawson, 1985;
Johnston, 1985). This is a good time to back off or change approaches
(Dawson, 1985).
A person's hands reveal much (Dawson, 1985; Johnston, 1985).
Drumming fingers indicate impatience (Dawson, 1985). Steepling is
an indication of supreme confidence (Johnston, 1985). Steepling is
the term for placing just the fingertips of each hand together with
the heels of the hands separated (Johnston, 1985). When under strain,
many people wring their hands (Dawson, 1985; Johnston, 1985).
The clues just mentioned are valid, but people are different and
so is the meaning of their body language. For instance, some people
smoke when they are nervous (Dawson, 1985). Some touch their noses
and drum their fingers many times a day and the motions mean
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nothing at all. Knowing the other persons natural habits and
characteristics is a key to interpreting body language accurately.
Body language alone should not be depended on during negotiations. It
is only a small piece of the puzzle; to help in "reading" the other
party. The technique of interpreting body language, tempered with
common sense, can be very effective in reaching win-win solutions
(Dawson, 1985; Johnston, 1985; NFCTC, 1985).
Silence
Silence is an extremely effective and simple negotiation tool.
But the technique of using and reading silence correctly eludes most
people. Silence can be a weapon or even a concession. The strength of
this non-aggressive action should not be underestimated.
Most people dislike silence and will attempt to eliminate it by
talking (Karrass, 1974b). This talking can provide valuable
information to the patient, silent negotiator. Of course an
experienced negotiator is not likely to provide a lot of information
just to fill a void. But an inexperienced or nervous negotiator will
often reveal far more than intended. The urge to fill silence with one
more argument, an extra detail, or an extra attempt at persuasion, is
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strong. This urge must be resisted, and should be used to obtain as
much valuable information as possible from one's opponent (Karrass,
1974b).
When silent, listen. "Listening is the least expensive concession
one can make. It can well be the most important" (Karrass, 1974b, p.
100). It is a concession of no tangible value, yet it is very valuable to
one's opponent. A speaker is presenting himself for approval. He
wants to be believed and understood. Listening intently gives one's
opponent what he wants, and provides valuable negotiating
information. Listening is a technique that provides benefits to both
sides. The person who masters the technique of listening will largely
increase his ability to profit.
Time and silence are effective negotiating tools. The time and
effort spent learning the techniques and use of these tools will






Documentation is required for all negotiated contracts as stated
in the FAR (FAR, 1986). The purpose of documentation is to justify
the price established in negotiations is fair and reasonable, and to
serve as a historical record (FAR, 1986; NFCTC, 1985). Included in
the documentation are negotiation results and significant
considerations which affected the final agreement (FAR, 1986;
NFCTC, 1985). The summary of the documentation and results is
called the Price negotiation memorandum (PNM) (NFCTC, 1985).
.
Price Negotiation Memorandum
Reports of analysis and specific information which contributed
to the determination that the final negotiated price was fair and
reasonable must be included in the documentation file. The PNM and
supporting file are used as justification for approval of the proposed
negotiation, as well as a reference for future acquisitions. An
accurate history of the acquisition is necessary due to rapid
personnel turnover rates, numerous acquisitions, and the use of
contract files in historical and investigational research (NFCTC,
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1985). A reconstruction of the major considerations used in reaching
a price agreement is required in the file. How the price was
determined and why it is considered fair and reasonable must
demonstrated clearly and conclusively in the file (FAR, 1986; NFCTC,
1985).
The story of the negotiation is told in the PNM. At a minimum
it contains the following information; (a) the purpose of the
negotiation, (b) a description of the acquisition, (c) the names and
positions of government and contractor personnel, (d) the
government's price objective and the basis for this amount, (e) a
summary of the contractor's proposal, (f) summary of discussions and
compelling arguments, (g) the significant facts and considerations
used to establish the pre-negotiation price objective and the
negotiated price, and (h) an explanation of any significant differences
between the two positions (FAR, 1986; NFCTC, 1985).
There is often a large accumulation of data by the end of
negotiations. Data from the contractor includes the price proposal,
supporting schedules, and subcontractor cost or pricing data (NFCTC,
1985). Information generated from the government, such as the
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independent government estimate and analysis of the contractor's
data is included in the PNM (NFCTC, 1985). Also included is an
explanation of how this data was used. Significant factual data is
identified, how the facts influenced estimates of costs are explained,
and what factors persuaded the negotiator to arrive at a particular
figure are noted. The extent to which factual data was not used is
also documented. Identified in the PNM are any cost or pricing data
which were found to be inaccurate, incomplete or outdated (FAR,
1986; NFCTC, 1985; U. S. Naval School, 1986).
The extent of detail required in the PNM is determined primarily
by the dollar amount (U. S. Naval School, 1986). Those negotiations
which do not meet the standards which require a Contract Award and
Review Board involve the least amount of detailed documentation.
Unlike Board reports and Business Clearance Memorandums, the PNM
for these small dollar amount negotiations remains in the field office
file. A historical summary and evidence that the price established is
fair and reasonable, but the effort should be in proportion to the size,
importance, and political sensitivity of the acquisition (FAR, 1986;




Negotiation and contractor selection are required by a Contract
Award and Review Board for the following; (a) selection of
architect/engineer firms if the fee is expected to be $2,500 or
greater, (b) construction contract change orders with an estimated
value of $50,000 or more, and (c) all other negotiations where the
amount is expected to be $25,000 or greater (NAVFACENGCOM, 1985).
When a Board is used to negotiate, the PNM is called a Board Report
(NAVFACENGCOM, 1985).
Business Clearance Memorandum
For contracts and change orders equal to or greater than
$100,000, a Business Clearance Memorandum (BCM) is required
(NAVFACENGCOM, 1985). The BCM is another form of the Price
Negotiation Memorandum. It consists of two parts, a pre-negotiation
clearance and a post-negotiation clearance (OICC Trident, 1985).
The pre-negotiation BCM is a request to negotiate. It is
prepared after the contractor's proposal has been evaluated and any
required audits have been performed. Addressed in it are the
requirements that must be met in order to initiate negotiations, for
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example (a) Equal Employment Opportunity clearance, (b) audit, (c)
profit analysis, and/or (d) determination and findings report Also
also outlined are significant details of the proposed negotiation such
as; a field and technical analysis, cost and price analysis addressing
all audit recommendations, and a negotiation strategy
(NAVFACENGCOM, 1985). Approval authority is based on the expected
dollar level of the negotiation. For example, the OICC level has
approval up to $5,000,000, and NAVFACENGCOM has approval authority
from $5,000,000 to $10,000,000. Negotiation above $10,000,000
requires Chief of Naval Operation approval (OICC Trident, 1985).
Part two, the post-negotiation clearance is prepared after the
negotiation is complete. Evidence that the agreement reached was
fair and reasonable is included, and serves as the historical record
for the negotiated procurement. Also included in the post-negotiation
BCM are the results of the negotiation, facts in addition to those in
the pre-negotiation clearance which complement the price and cost
analysis, and justification of any differences between the




In either form shown above, the PNM contains the documentation
demonstrating that the final agreement was fair and reasonable. By
including all significant background data, actions, and the results of
the negotiation, the PNM serves as as important historical document





The purpose of this paper was to examine construction contract
negotiation as it applies to the Navy CEC officer. The $2-3 billion
each year in military construction performed by civilian contractors
(NAVFACENGCOM, 1986) ensures the CEC officer of exposure to the
negotiation environment. The growth in the number of military
construction contracts (NAVFACENGCOM, 1986) further emphasizes
the need for negotiation expertise in the CEC.
Topics examined include the circumstances which allow
procurement through negotiation vice formal advertising, the three
phases of the negotiation process, and recommended approaches to
these phases.
Chapter two, Government Contract Negotiations , focused on the
specific circumstances which allow negotiated procurement. The
specific conditions are defined in United States Code, section 2304
(1986). In general, procurement through negotiation is allowed when
formal advertising is not feasible. Formal advertising is not feasible
if; (a) detailed plans and specifications are not available, (b) the work
is classified, (c) a sufficient number of bidders is not available, or
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(d) sufficient time is not available. The conditions which must exist
in order to negotiate construction contracts are also defined in
chapter two as well as the types of contracts which meet these
conditions. Negotiations with the contractor are also performed after
contract award. Bilateral change orders and contract terminations
are the most common types of post-award negotiations.
The focus of chapter three, Preparation and Strategy, was the
importance of preparation and how preparation applies to developing
strategy. Preparation is the most important phase of the negotiating
process due to the vast impact on all actions which follow. There
were four factors given which should be considered when developing
negotiation strategies. Location, climate, timing, and the negotiation
agenda significantly effect negotiation results.
The negotiation team approach, as discussed in chapter three,
has proven to be successful in developing and carrying out strategy. A
team provides more information and expertise than one person
possesses. However, in order to be effective, the team members must
all work towards the same goals and be willing to put the team's
goals before their own.
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The Truth-in-Negotiations Act was also included in chapter
three due to its value in price and cost analysis. The act requires,
under certain conditions, that the contractor provide certification
stating the cost and pricing data supporting the contractor's proposal
is accurate, complete, and current. The purpose of this law is to
provide safeguards for the government against inflated cost
proposals.
Described in chapter four, Performing the Negotiation , was the
process of opening a negotiation and the phases of negotiation
performance. Opening the negotiation involves developing
understanding, interest, and support of both teams. The government
must concentrate on punctuality, personal appearance, and the
formalities of introductions as well as establishing ground rules,
power and authority, while creating a sense of objectivity and
fairness. The opening process can determine whether a negotiation
will be orderly and productive or confused and misguided. Performing
the negotiation involves two major stages; (a) the exploratory phase,
and (b) the agreement phase. The exploratory phase is an information
gathering session with the contractor. Assumptions, issues and
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objectives are evaluated for validity. Strategies are altered to
reflect new information. The agreement phase involves moving
towards an agreement which satisfies each party's needs. There are
three ways to influence the other party to move; (a) domination, (b)
compromise, and (c) concessions. Due to the concessions method
being founded in reason, it is the preferred method for reaching
agreement.
Described in chapter five, Mental Attitude and Approach , was
the importance of a positive mental attitude in one's approach to
negotiation, the effects of communication and ethics on the
negotiation results, and the value of win-win negotiating. Effective
communication is important to the process of reaching agreement.
Communicating with a virtual stranger in a potentially hostile and
suspicious environment is particularly difficult. Included in this
chapter were the major areas of communication difficulties and
methods of avoiding pitfalls. The highest standards of conduct are
expected of all government personnel, and this should be reflected in
the CEC officer's ethics. The philosophies of win-win negotiating
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reflect high ethical standards that every officer and contractor is
encouraged to adopt.
Described in chapter six, Tactics , were the short-run methods
and procedures for reaching the long range goals of strategy. Tactics
were divided into two areas, maneuvers and techniques. Maneuvers
are moves or ploys for securing a position of advantage. Techniques
are negotiating tools. Time, and forms of non-verbal communication
such as silence and body language, can be powerful tools if properly
utilized. Learning to use these maneuvers and tools, as well as to
interpret and understand when others use them, can provide a distinct
advantage for the win-win negotiator.
The focus of chapter seven, Negotiation Documentation , was the
Price Negotiation Memorandum (PNM). The purpose of the PNM is to
justify the price established in negotiations as fair and reasonable,
and to serve as a historical record. Included in the document are
negotiation results and significant considerations which affected the
final agreement. Under certain conditions, the PNM takes the form of
a Board Report. Under other conditions it is termed a Business
Clearance Memorandum. Under other conditions, it takes the form of a
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simple memorandum to the field office file. In all of these forms, the
PNM contains the documents demonstrating the final agreement was
fair and reasonable, and it serves as an important historical record.
The purpose of this paper was to examine the methods and
procedures of negotiations, which when used, enable the CEC officer
to perform effective negotiations. Provided is the material necessary
to understand the circumstances under which negotiation is allowed,
phases of negotiation, and approaches to negotiation. If developed and
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